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The Short- and Long-Term Effects of the 
Authoritarian Regime and of Nazism in  
Austria: The Burden of a ‘Second  
Dictatorship’ [2006] 
Gerhard Botz ∗ 
Abstract: »Kurz- und langfristige Effekte des autoritären Regimes und Natio-
nalsozialismus in Österreich: Die Belastung einer ,zweiten Diktatur‘«. This arti-
cle considers two types of right extremism in Austria’s history: Nazism and the 
preceding ‘Austro-Fascism’ that tried to resist Nazism. By first considering the 
roots of ‘Austro-Fascism’, followed by how Austrians reacted to Nazism on so-
cial, political and economic levels, the author identifies the ‘victim myth’ found 
in Austrian history after 1945 and is able to uncover how the post-war period 
was impacted by and tried to distance itself from Austria’s long relationship 
with German nationalism and two dictatorial pasts (the authoritarian dictator-
ship of Dollfuß and Schuschnigg, and the Nazi regime). The article is structured 
as follows: 1. ‘Austro-Fascism': Interlude and Austrian Symptom, 2. Impacts of 
the Nazi Dictatorship (1938-1945), 3. National Identity and the ‘Victim Myth’, 
4. Reconstruction of the State, Inconsistent Denazification and Continuities, 5. 
The ‘Long Durée’ of the Nazi Heritage, 6. Conclusion. 
Keywords: Fascism, Austria, Nazism, denazification, “victim myth“, national 
identity, Austria’s Second Republic. 
 
One major reason for Austria’s difficulties in coming to terms with its dictatorial 
past is the well-known, but often underestimated, fact that it had experienced two 
kinds of dictatorship, ‘Austro-Fascism’ and Nazism. Generally speaking, both 
versions were embedded in the country’s political, social and cultural traditions, 
they displayed some – or even many – corresponding aspects, but nevertheless 
fought each other. After the defeat of Nazism, the establishment of a consensual 
democracy in Austria had necessarily to exclude the former Nazis from government 
and to bring the left (Social Democrats and Communists) together with the former 
‘Austro-Fascists’ (Catholic conservatives or Christian-Socials) in a coalition gov-
ernment. Similar political constellations can be observed in many European states. 
In the Austrian case, the specificity was that – given the great differences between 
‘Austro-Fascism’ and Nazism – one kind of dictatorial rule was whitewashed in 
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order to leave the Catholic conservative element a chance to preserve its historic 
roots to some extent. Thus, and besides other factors, the drive for a critical evalua-
tion of the non-democratic traditions inside Austrian society was reduced even 
more and the tendency to sacrifice the historic truth to ‘conflict reduction’ and 
compromise was high. Only after 1989 has it become clear that comparable – not 
equal – structures existed in those countries which had experienced another kind of 
second dictatorship, i.e. Communism. But in the 1980s it became increasingly 
evident that structurally similar problems had been imposed on many Western 
European states where Nazi occupation and persecution had produced collaborators, 
and where the myth of a generalised resistance movement often functioned in the 
same way as the ‘victim’ myth in Austria. 
Along this principle line of interpretation of the Austrian case, in this chapter I 
will examine in detail the effects of both kinds of non-democratic experiences, their 
interference, compensation or reinforcement, distinguishing between temporary, 
short-term and long-term effects on various political and societal levels.1 
1.  ‘Austro-Fascism': Interlude and Austrian Symptom 
When Nazism gained its electoral landslide in 1932,2 and Austria approached the 
trough of the economic depression, the Christian-Social Chancellor Engelbert Doll-
fuss gave in to Mussolini’s pressure and Austrian authoritarian traditions, and in-
cluded the Heimwehr in his government. Step-by-step, he abolished the civil rights 
and the social gains of the working classes. Exploiting a crisis in the internal rules 
of the houses of Parliament, he began to turn Austria towards non-democratic rule. 
In 1933, shortly after Nazism’s seizure of power in Germany, Austria became a 
semi-dictatorship. This was turned into a full-fledged dictatorship after the regime’s 
victory over the uprising of the militant parts of Social Democracy in February 
1934. Several days of bloody street battles in Vienna and other industrial centres 
were to leave deep wounds in the memories of the members of the non-Nazi 
‘camps’ of Austria’s political culture, far beyond 1938 and 1945. This fact explains 
why, after 1945, overcoming this political trench became the main task for the 
reconstruction of Austrian democracy for so many years. 
The Heimwehr was the only openly Fascist factor in the emerging Christian 
Ständestaat (‘corporatist state’) and, though already in decline, temporarily gained 
strong influence. Nevertheless, the dictatorship of Dollfuss (who was murdered 
during the Nazi putsch of July 1934) and his successor, Kurt Schuschnigg, re-
mained within the limits of traditional dictatorial rule common at that time in nearly 
                                                             
1  See my earlier 1998 article: Janus-headed Austria. Transition from Nazism as Restoration, 
Continuity and Learning Process, in Modern Europe after Fascism 1943-1980s, vol. 1, ed. S. 
U. Larsen and B. Hagtvet, vol. 1, New York, 339-77. 
2  See B. F. Pauley, 1951, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis. A History of Austrian National 
Socialism, Chapel Hill; F. L. Carsten, 1977, Fascist Movements in Austria. From Schönerer to 
Hitler, London; G. Botz, 1980, The Changing Patterns of Social Support for Austrian National 
Socialism, in Who Were the Fascists. Social Roots of European Fascism, ed. S. U. Larsen, B. 
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all European countries except Western and Northern Europe.3 Their authoritarian 
regime used mainly the police force, bureaucratic procedures and their political 
monopoly. Thus it served rather to demobilise than to mobilise the crisis-driven 
middle classes and to alienate large segments of the working classes from the Aus-
trian state.4 
The authoritarian regime imitated half-heartedly the style of organisation, prop-
aganda and politics of the two leading Fascist powers in the south and west of 
Austria. In May 1934, the official proclamation of a corporatist constitution re-
mained hardly more than an ideological cover for what was essentially governmen-
tal and bureaucratic autocracy.5 Nevertheless, for four years the so-called ‘Austro-
Fascist’ regime managed to mediate (using force) between contrasting social and 
political interests, and to resist Nazi pressures from inside and outside. Among 
other centralising facts it established a unified Austrian Federation of Trade Unions 
(ÖGB), which became a precursor of the post-1945 unified organisation of labour 
unions, and thus this continuity can serve as an example to explain how inventions 
of the authoritarian dictatorship unintentionally paved the way for the structures of 
the Second Republic. 
The authoritarian regime’s deflationary economic policy was largely unsuccess-
ful. Therefore, it was not able to leave many architectural monuments. Among its 
proposed construction programme, aimed at reducing the huge unemployment rate of 
about 25 percent, only a few prestigious road projects were actually carried out. Sev-
eral of them, like the Großglockner High Alpine Road, were finished only by the Nazi 
regime. A few monumental buildings were constructed in a style blending leftovers 
from the Viennese architectural modernity of 1900 with Alpine provincialism and 
contemporary Italian and German imperial pomp. Among them were the Viennese 
radio station building and the Salzburg Festival House, and the remarkably progres-
sive exhibition pavilion at the Art Biennale in Venice.6 These expressions of state 
art were thought to serve as the representation of an Austrian identity, and this is in 
fact the case still. Such projects offer a taste of the original official ideology of the 
authoritarian regime, which sought to counter the German identity of so many Austri-
ans and to resist the aspirations and pressures from the side of Nazi Germany. 
The elements of this artificial collective identity, to which I will return later on, 
were condensed in the call for a plebiscite in March 1938 which the failing authori-
                                                             
3  S. G. Pavne, 1980, Fascism. Comparison and Definition, Madison. 
4  H. Wohnout, 1993, Regierungsdiktatur oder Ständeparlament? Gesetzgebung im autoritä-
ren Osterreich, Vienna, Cologne and Graz; W. Putschek, 1993, Ständische Verfassung und 
Verfassungspraxis in Österreich 1933-1938 mit Dokumentenanhang, Frankfurt a. M. 
5  F. Talos and W. Neugebauer, eds., 1988, 'Austrofaschismus.' Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie 
und Kultur, 4th ed., Vienna; U. Kluge, 1984, Der österreichische Ständestaat 1934-1938. 
Entstehung und Scheitern, Vienna; G. Botz, 1987, Krisenzonen einer Demokratie. Gewalt, 
Streik und Konfliktunterdrückung in Österreich seit 1918, Frankfurt a. M. and New York, 
211-36. 
6  A. Müller, 1993, Josef Hoffmanns Pavillon auf dem Biennale-Gelände in Venedig und Fragen 
Österreichischer Identitäten in den 30er Jahren, in Österreichs Beitrag zur 45. Biennale von 
Venedig 1993, ed. P. Weibel, Vienna, 65-93. J. Tabor, ed. 1994, Kunst und Diktatur. Architek-
tur, Bildhauerei und Malerei in Österreich, Deutschland, Italien und der Sowjetunion 1922-
1956, vol. 2, Bad Vöslau. 
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tarian state planned as a last minute rescue, but had to abandon under Hitler’s pres-
sure: ‘For a free and German, independent, social, Christian and united Austria!’7 
These adjectives characterised in concise form the programme of the ‘Christian 
corporatist state,’ but also show the specific advantages and weaknesses of its con-
cept of Austria. 
Although this mostly Catholic Austrian identity was defined by stressing politi-
cal independence from Germany, its inventors referred simultaneously to a shared 
German cultural identity without building on democratic legitimisation and eco-
nomic and social success. Austria’s identity should not be a ‘small German,’ a 
Prussian one, but rather a ‘Greater German’ identity of the type of the old Holy 
Roman Empire before the exclusion of Austria in 1866. It should fulfil a European 
mission and constitute a bridge between German culture on the one side and other 
nations, especially in the south east of Europe on the other side. In retrospect, at 
least, it seems obvious that an ideological construction which presented itself with 
reference to the ‘other Germany’ or the ‘better Germans’ was bound to fall in the 
face of the pan-German enthusiasm of the Nazis. Austrian communists also devel-
oped the idea of a separate Austrian nation,8 but did not succeed in influencing a 
large share of the unsatisfied workers. Nevertheless, this kind of Austrian national 
identity was to become the basis on which the successful nation-building process of 
the Second Republic was possible, and in this respect, modern Austrian national 
identity can be considered to some extent also as a long-term effect of the Catholic 
conservative dictatorship. 
In March 1938, after a shift in the European balance of power in Hitler’s favour, 
the Austrian regime collapsed. Fascist Italy, Austria’s main protector, had aban-
doned it for the ‘Axis’ with Germany. Leaving out of consideration the acts of 
radical anti-Semitism and the severe persecution of the political left which Nazism 
imposed on Austria, it should be noted that immediately after the Anschluss, a 
stringent purge of Austrian Fascism was carried out by the Nazis. This was certain-
ly the main reason why the Second Republic seven years later could acquit the 
‘Austro-Fascists,’ as I have noted already in the introductory remarks. Indeed many 
of them had suffered during the Nazi period and not a few became audacious anti-
Nazi resistance fighters. And, as a matter of fact, many of the former ‘Austro-
Fascists,’ having experienced the purges of the Nazi dictatorship, after 1945, per-
manently turned away from their earlier non-democratic traditions. 
2.  Impacts of the Nazi Dictatorship (1938-1945) 
In March 1938, the Anschluss was perceived by a great many Austrians as the 
recognition of their claim to the national self-determination they had been denied 
after 1918 by the treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain. Thus, the Anschluss of 
                                                             
7  A. Staudinger, 1977, Zur Österreich-Ideologie des Ständestaates, in Das Juliabkommen von 
1936. Vorgeschichte, Hintergründe und Folgen, Vienna, 195-240; F. Hanisch, 1977, Die Ideo-
logie des politischen Katholizismus in Österreich 1918-1933, Vienna and Salzburg. 
8  A. Klahr, 1937, Zur nationalen Frage in Osterreich, Weg und Ziel 1937 (3). 
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1938 resulted not only from immense military pressure from abroad and the inva-
sion of the Wehrmacht9 but also from the seizure of power by the National Social-
ists using the hierarchical structure inside the ‘corporate state’ as well as a quasi-
revolutionary uprising by the Nazi masses from below. Within a few months, Na-
tional Socialism reshaped and radicalised the existing dictatorial rule and thorough-
ly transformed society and politics in Austria.10 
The specific irresistibility and radicalism of the Nazi dictatorship, its neo-pagan 
völkisch ideology and its fervent militaristic expansionism constituted a great dif-
ference from the former ‘Austro-Fascist’ regime. However, with some simplifica-
tion it can be said that Nazism had similar socio-political aims, in part the same 
targets of its acts of persecution, and to some extent even related means of force.11 
Therefore, Nazism could use the autocratic structures already imposed on Austria 
by the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg government. After autumn 1938, the tendencies to-
wards the internal (and external) radicalisation of the Third Reich began to override 
these last constraints upon totalitarian rule, driven by the most radical Nazi forces: 
the SS. But Nazi terror always went together with regime consensus among large 
segments of Austrian society. 
The Nazi dictatorship, when mobilising for the war and persecuting the Jews, 
could rely upon broad support from non-Nazi groups in Austrian society, especially 
among the traditional German nationalists and the Catholic conservative middle 
classes and peasants, as well as from considerable segments of the working classes. 
Many of them were attracted by the prospect of gaining the fulfilment of frustrated 
social and economic expectations through a war of expansion and the extermination 
policy. Nazism was in reality never based exclusively on its militant activists, party 
members and followers of its manifold sub-organisations. It always depended as 
well upon unspoken or partial support from the great masses of the German ‘master 
race,’ or at least on the absence of opposition. At the climax of Nazism’s power in 
1943, no less than 693,000 persons living in the territories of the enlarged Austrian 
Reichsgaue12 or roughly 30 percent of all politically active male Austrians had 
formally joined the Nazi party. This was a higher membership rate than in most 
parts of the so-called ‘Old Reich’ area. These figures alone may explain why dena-
zification would become such a difficult task after 1945 and why Austrian society 
has kept so many Nazi or para-Nazi traits alive. 
Considering all circumstances, social protest and political resistance were not 
widespread in Austria during the Nazi period. A simple comparison of figures 
demonstrates how unequal resistance and regime support had been distributed 
                                                             
9  N. Staudinger, 1978, Der Griff nach Österreich. Der Anschluß, Vienna; Anschluß 1938. 
Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 14. und 15. Mai 1978, Vienna and Munich, 1981; 
'Anschluß' 1938. Eine Dokumentation, Vienna, 1988. 
10  G. Botz, 1988, Nationalsozialismus in Wien. Machtübernahme und Herrschaftssicherung 
1938/39, 3rd ed. Buchloe; S. Karner, 1986, Die Steiermark im Dritten Reich, 2nd ed., Graz. 
11  E. Talos, F. Hanisch and W. Neugebauer, eds., 1988, NS-Herrschaft in Österreich 1938-1945, 
Vienna. 
12  G. Jagschitz, Von der "Bewegung zum Apparat" in NS-Herrschaft, ed. Talos et al., 487-516; 
G. Botz, 1987, Austria, in The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements, ed. D. Mühlber-
ger, London. 
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among Austrians: about 100,000 persecuted resistance fighters stood against more 
than six times as many Nazis inside the boundaries of modern Austria.13 Even the 
stone monuments and remains from this period show this asymmetry: on the one 
hand, the granite outer walls, entrance gates and the rotting wooden inmate barracks 
of the concentration camp of Mauthausen with over four dozen branch camps where 
about 200,000 victims of Nazism from all of Europe (only about 2,000 of them 
were Austrian ‘political prisoners’) had been interned, and nearly half of them died 
or were murdered.14 At least these sites have become places of official anti-Nazi 
commemoration since the 1960s.15 On the other hand, the numerous war memorials 
in every village and town celebrating the Austrians killed in action for ‘Heimat, 
people and fatherland’ rarely distinguish between the First and Second World Wars; 
they often list for commemoration the Waffen SS men killed in battle as well.16 
Only since the late 1980s has a growing sense of awareness of this disproportionate 
presentation of the collective memory and serious attempts to build monuments for 
the victims of Nazism been observed. Only now is a major monument for the mur-
dered Jews going to be erected in Austria. 
The Nazi regime dissolved Austria as a coherent political and administrative 
unit, deprived Vienna of its capital functions, first replaced the name ‘Österreich’ 
by ‘Ostmark’ and soon thereafter, as an expression of the Third Reich’s intention to 
extinguish all memories of Austria, forbade even the use of the word ‘Ostmark’ or 
any other unifying word. But as a matter of fact the administrative sub-divisions of 
the country, the Länder, were so firmly embedded in people’s habits, in everyday 
communications, in the areas of competence of the various bureaucracies, and in the 
mentality of the Austrian Nazi leadership itself, that after 1938 the German central-
ists were able to change the regional administrative structures only to a marginal 
degree. These effects of Nazism lasted only seven years. 
The non-Jewish elites in business and many areas of cultural life managed to re-
tain their positions. This is true even considering the abolition of all the ‘Christian 
corporatist’ organisations, which were replaced by similar bodies within the Nazi 
system, and the replacement of those holding top positions in politics and state 
bureaucracy.17 There was a real change from the first year of Nazism in Austria. 
The integration into the Nazi ‘new social order’ made Austria emerge very differ-
ently from the Third Reich; which proved for many individual Austrians so disas-
trous. It also eroded the privileges of the upper classes which had survived the first 
                                                             
13  V. Neugebauer, Widerstand und Opposition, in NS-Herrschaft, ed. Talos et al., 535-52; also: 
R. Luža, 1984, The Resistance in Austria 1938-1945, Minneapolis. 
14  H. Maršalek, 1995, Die Geschichte des Konzentrationslagers Mauthausen, 3rd ed., Vienna. 
15  J. F. Young, 1993, The Texture of Memory. Holocaust Memorials and Meaning, New Haven 
and London, 91-112. 
16  H. Uhl and S. Riesenfellner, 1994, Todeszeichen. Denkmäler der Zeitgeschichte in Graz und 
in der Steiermark vom Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart, Vienna, Cologne and 
Graz. 
17  R. Luža, 1975, Austro-German Relations in the Anschluss Era, Princeton; G. Botz, 1988, Die 
Eingliederung Österreichs in das Deutsche Reich. Planung und Verwirklichung des politisch-
administrativen Anschlusses, 3rd ed., Vienna. 
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Republic, and changed some of the traditional restrictions of a class society which 
in 1938 still retained many traces of its ‘feudal’ past. 
The most severe and long-lasting consequences on the shape of Austria’s society 
and economy resulted from the persecution and annihilation of the Jews. Large-
scale theft of Jewish property, called ‘Aryanisation,’ preceded the expulsion and 
extinction of more than 190,000 Austrian Jews, most of whom had been living in 
Vienna. The ‘Aryanisation’ process deprived Austria of its large Jewish middle 
class as well as Jewish industrialists and bankers.18 Also taking into account the 
‘Aryanisation’ of more than 60,000 apartments, tens of thousands of work places 
and small businesses, to say nothing of furniture and other valuables, at least in 
Vienna, the expropriation of Jewish property amounted to a veritable socioeconom-
ic ‘revolution’ of a magnitude the country had never experienced, either in 1918 or 
in 1848. Austrian society, not only Nazis proper, profited immensely from the 
transfer of Jewish property; according to my estimation, an amount of hundreds of 
billions of Schilling of its present value is involved, a fact which has only been 
acknowledged recently. 
In addition, the sectors of culture and education (especially literature and jour-
nalism), the arts and sciences suffered heavily from the forced emigration and the 
annihilation of the Jewish community which had been prominently represented in 
these professions. Here, Jewish intellectuals and artists had created much of what 
constitutes today Vienna’s fame as a city of culture and science around the turn of 
the century. The ‘exclusion of the Jews from society’ left a lasting gap in post-1945 
Austria and deprived it of a great part of its intellectual elite. 
In contrast to these irreparable non-material losses, which many Austrians have 
preferred not to discuss for a long time, the confiscation of the considerable gold 
and foreign currency reserves of the Austrian National Bank has always been con-
sidered as a harmful matter in Austria after 1945. At the same time, the Third 
Reich’s exploitation of the unused reserves of labour in Austria (before 1938), its 
low wage levels, natural resources and the availability of raw materials in agricul-
ture and forestry has often been judged only as a negative effect for the Austrians, 
whereas all this also attracted German capital to Austria after the Anschluss. As a 
matter of fact, together with the ‘Aryanisation,’ this led to a marked German infil-
tration of the Austrian economy which again, in the medium term, proved unwill-
ingly and indirectly – by the expropriation of ‘German property’ after 1945 – to be 
the foundation for one of the most important pillars of economic and social policy 
in the Second Republic: the nationalisation of much of the country’s steel produc-
tion, electric power plants and banking sector.19 
                                                             
18  H. Rosenkranz, 1978, Verfolgung und Selbstbehauptung. Die Juden in Österreich 1938-
1945, Vienna and Munich; H. Safrian and H. Witek, 1988, Und keiner war dabei. Dokumente 
des alltäglichen Antisemitismus in Wien 1938, Vienna. 
19  K. W. Rothschild, 1961, Wurzeln und Triebkräfte der Entwicklung der österreichischen 
Wirtschaftsstruktur, in Österreichs Wirtschaftsstruktur: gestern – heute – morgen, vol. 1, 
cd. W. Weber, Berlin, 1-158; also F. Weber, 1992, Die Spuren der NS-Zeit in der österreichi-
schen Wirtschaftsentwicklung, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften 3 
(2): 135-65. 
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The Anschluss brought with it a boost to the economy behind which lay the full 
weight of the economic and military expansionist policies of the Third Reich. It was 
not by chance that one of the priorities of the Third Reich was construction; its 
monumental functionality still serves, for instance, to bridge the central road over 
the Danube and to serve the main railway station in Linz, Hitler’s beloved home 
town.20 A system of Autobahnen (motorways) was also planned in Austria, but 
realised only to a small extent before the Nazi regime had to concentrate its eco-
nomic resources on more direct war efforts. But thousands of Austrian families and 
many of the young soldiers of the democratic Austrian army are still housed in 
condominiums and barracks bearing the stylistic features of this time – and not at 
all having the past of their immediate surroundings in mind. 
A further and even more concrete consequence of the economic Anschluss dur-
ing the expansionary phase of the Third Reich was that many new enterprises, with 
the essential factor of hundreds of thousands of slave labourers from the occupied 
and controlled countries of Europe, especially from the East, were established and 
developed. They were of such magnitude that no small state could possibly have 
initiated them on the basis of its own internal economic resources. These involved 
the expansion of petroleum production, the iron and steel industry, hydroelectric 
power, and the chemical industry in particular. Especially in the province of Upper 
Austria, the huge steel works of the Linz ‘Hermann Göring Werke’ which, after 
1945, were rebuilt and expanded into the state-owned ‘VÖEST,’ were a symbol of 
Austria’s industrial success until the 1980s, without changing the fact that many 
Austrians of the older generations have associated this plant with Hitler and Göring, 
the master of the ‘Four Year Plan.’21 Thus, throughout Austria the number of indus-
trial labourers, among them a large percentage of foreign work slaves, employed in 
large firms increased by 80 percent between 1930 and 1946 and kept growing on 
the newly established basis until the 1970s.22 
The acceleration of industrialisation during the Nazi period was also accompa-
nied by a marked orientation of the Austrian economy towards the West, the further 
development of the country’s tourist industry (specifically adapted to meet wartime 
needs until 1945), and the encouragement of mechanisation and increased produc-
tion in agriculture. The relative shift towards the West, which the economy under-
went between the censuses of 1934 and 1951, was one factor behind the decrease in 
the share of the population within the three eastern federal provinces by 8 percent 
until 1951 (Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland which had comprised together 
54.5 percent of Austria’s population before 1938). This contrasts with a slight 
increase in the southern parts of Austria, Carinthia and Styria, by 1.8 percent, and a 
considerable growth in the western Länder (Upper Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol and 
Vorarlberg) by 5.2 percent.23 
                                                             
20  E. B. Bukey, 1993, Patenstadt des Führers. Eine Politik- und Sozialgeschichte von Linz 1908-
1945, Frankfurt a. M. and New York. 
21  H. Fiereder, 1983, Die Reichswerke Hermann Göring in Österreich (1938-1945), Vienna and 
Salzburg. 
22  S. Koren, Die Industrialisierung Österreichs, in Österreichs Wirtschaftsstruktur, ed. Weber, 
159-223. 
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During the subsequent history of the Second Republic, these remaining trends 
resulted not only in important sociological changes, but also affected the voting 
patterns and the growth of federalism. One could even say that the Austrian prov-
inces underwent a ‘modernisation,’24 which also meant that the structural contrasts 
between provinces (Länder) and the metropolis (Vienna) became less and less 
pronounced. On the other hand Vienna became provincialised, a burden that has 
often been overlooked by Austrian politicians and historians. From the standpoint 
of fifty years of Austrian postwar politics, this fact may, at least partly, account for 
the reduction of the intense sociopolitical conflicts which had led to the breakdown 
of the First Republic. 
In particular, as I have pointed out, the Nazi period speeded up the reorientation 
and change of the country’s society and economy, which had not progressed much 
after 1918, and made it possible for post-1945 Austria to overcome the structural 
deficiencies of the original rump state remaining from the Habsburg Empire.25 
Thus, what I wish here to call the Anschluss paradox occurred: the pre-1938 An-
schluss tendencies, which had been caused not least by the economic and social 
weaknesses of the First Republic, could be surmounted only after the Nazi version 
of Anschluss had altered most preconditions of Austria’s earlier inclination towards 
a mythical past and the powerful German protector. Equally, the experience of 
German dominance ended by strengthening the Austrians’ self-confidence.26 
3.  National Identity and the ‘Victim Myth’ 
At the turning point of the Second World War a kind of anti-Nazi and even stronger 
anti-German consensus developed among a growing, but still limited number of 
Austrians.27 This is true especially for the leaders and functionaries of the former 
Christian-Socials and ‘Austro-Fascists’ as well as for the communist activists in the 
underground, but also for the many Social Democrats. Thus, a kind of anti-
Fascism28 and anti-Germanism became the common denominator of the new politi-
cal beginnings immediately after the fall of the Third Reich. However, Fascism was 
considered differently according to personal experience and political convictions. 
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The former Christian-Socials pointed to the essential differences between ‘Austro-
Fascism’ and National Socialism; but followers of the Heimwehr, remaining with-
out a proper successor organisation, had mainly turned to the Austrian People’s 
Part)’ (ÖVP), if they had not become Nazis. 
The differences between ‘Austro-Fascism’ and Nazism were obvious not only 
for Jews and other ‘racial enemies’ but also for those who had been persecuted for 
political reasons by the Nazis. The ‘Austro-Fascists’ had been the masters in the 
preceding authoritarian rule; for them, anti-Fascism did not make sense and, at best, 
could only be anti-Nazi. Non-Jewish Social Democrats who, in general, had suf-
fered under both Austrian dictatorships and sometimes had been even to a higher 
degree political victims of the ‘Christian corporate state’ saw matters differently; 
for them, both versions of dictatorial rule looked rather similar and they accepted 
the Austro-Marxist criteria of ‘Fascism.’ The Communists, following the lines of 
the pre-war Communist International and the slogans of the ‘People’s Front’ against 
Nazism, put a universal anti-Fascism at the centre of their political agenda for the 
immediate post-1945 order. But, in the Austrian case, where ‘Austro-Fascism’ 
preceded and opposed the Nazi dictatorship, they had joined forces against ‘Cleri-
cal-Fascism’ and included them in their vision of a ‘people’s front,’ exculpating 
them from Fascism. Thus, in the Austrian case, anti-Fascism beyond anti-Nazism 
had few adherents among all major political ‘camps’ and could hardly be a more 
than a phrase and political rhetoric. This fact, together with the mass support for 
Nazism, might explain why, in contrast to Italy or Yugoslavia,29 Austria lacked any 
significant sign of a revolutionary anti-Fascist movement. 
Moreover, the Soviet army immediately after reaching Austrian territory inhibit-
ed activities like those of the weak, but politically overarching Austrian resistance 
movement OE and relied totally on the restoration of the former non-pan-German 
and non-Nazi parties. Later in 1945, the Western Allies also admitted and re-
established the former political forces,30 i.e. the Social Democrats, the former 
Christian-Socials and members of the ‘Fatherland Front’ of the Dollfuss-
Schuschnigg era (which formed the ÖVP) and the Communists (who were expected 
but failed to gain a much higher following than they had had in the period of illegal-
ity after 1933). These three political parties, in fact, were the main forces shaping 
the revived Austrian republic. 
As has been reported in many memoirs and oral accounts, Austrian politicians 
had started relatively early to discuss the future of their country after the foreseea-
ble fall of the Third Reich.31 There seems to be a true nucleus in many narratives 
about the rebirth of the Austrian consensus as far as the surviving prisoners of 
concentration camps like Dachau and Buchenwald are concerned. Taken at face 
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value, such a historical interpretation was not totally wrong, but in hindsight this 
consensus is rather a retroprojection. Nevertheless, in the course of the Second 
Republic, such perspectives at least grounded Austria’s national identity and politi-
cal stability on a widely accepted political myth.32 Similar views had been ex-
pressed by resistance groups, especially by the Communists, and especially by 
Austrians in exile.33 At least on the surface, a spirit of mutual forgiveness between 
the political left and the conservative right was often expressed. 
The common denominator of such a ‘consensus of the camp road,’ which was 
particularly emphasised during the 1950s, was the independence of Austria from 
Germany and Austrian patriotism; the deep political fragmentation, which had led 
to civil war and opened the doors for Nazism, should be overcome through coopera-
tion by all anti-Nazi parties and by minimising political conflict. It was considered 
that the First Republic had been doomed to failure because ‘The Christian-Socials 
were good Austrians, but bad democrats. The Austrian Socialists were good demo-
crats, but bad Austrians’34 as the communist intellectual Ernst Fischer said. 
Immediately after 1945, besides some attempts in the US occupation zone, for-
mer Heimwehr Fascists and functionaries of the Dollfuss dictatorship were hardly 
investigated or even punished35 for what they had done in the 1930s. Nevertheless, 
under the surface many Social Democrats were not able to forget the ‘Austro-
Fascists’ acts of violence, breaking of the constitutional law, and having taken 
economic and professional advantage of the oppression of their political opponents 
between 1933 and 1938. On the other hand their conservative opponents for a long 
time did not trust that their partners in the coalition government had really given up 
class struggle and Marxist ideas.36 Thus, the mutual wish to control the opponent-
partner by embracing him tightly became an additional motivation for the formation 
and continuation of the Great Coalition government until 1966. 
The most decisive impulse for the rebirth of the idea of an independent Austria 
came from the side of the Allied Great Powers. In 1938, they had tacitly accepted 
the Anschluss, but had begun making plans for the future of Germany as the for-
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tunes of war turned in their favour.37 It was the ‘Moscow Declaration’ of 1 Novem-
ber 1943, which announced their intention (my italics) ‘that Austria, the first free 
country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German 
domination’ and ‘that they wish to re-establish a free and independent Austria.’ 
Through this, the Austrian people ought to find a way to ‘political and economic 
security which is the only basis for lasting peace.’ But they added: ‘Austria is re-
minded, however, that she has responsibility which she cannot evade for participa-
tion in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement 
account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.’38 
The italicised words above also outline the kind of implicit minimum consensus 
among the founders of the Second Republic, who started to meet shortly after the 
Soviet Army had liberated the major part of Vienna and to reconstruct their former 
party organisations. In their former political careers they were functionaries of the 
two big pre-1933/38 parties who had hibernated through Nazism inside the country 
and communists who had returned with the Red Army from their exile mostly in 
Moscow. Practically all of them had already been politically active before the Nazi 
era. Besides Chancellor Karl Renner, they had not belonged to the top politicians of 
the pre-1938 period, or had withdrawn from active politics earlier. Also trade union 
functionaries were among the first to meet and revive the idea of a unified ÖGB 
which could strongly participate in the politics of the early years of the Second 
Republic. In contrast to the time before 1934 and 1938, the Catholic Church did not 
return to the political arena as a direct political factor. 
Leaders of these organisations shifted the points of future Austrian politics, even 
before the Second Republic was officially founded. Under the auspices of the Rus-
sians, they decided to cooperate and issued a proclamation of Austria’s independ-
ence on 27 April 1945. In this and other documents, they repeated and emphasised 
the promises in the first sentences of the Moscow Declaration but only quoted 
‘dutifully’ the last sentence (about Austria’s responsibility) which later was often 
totally omitted.39 Thus they refounded the Austrian state even before the capitula-
tion of the Third Reich, and paved the way, together with other factors, for the re-
establishment of the unity of the country. But they also laid the foundations on 
which the myth of Austria as a ‘victim of Nazism’ could flourish until the recent 
past. The very same day they also formed a provisional government under Renner 
(SPÖ) who had already been the first head of government in 1918. 
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4.  Reconstruction of the State, Inconsistent 
Denazification and Continuities 
The treatment of the Austrians by the Allied occupation forces was inconsistent, 
varying according to occupation zones, and was not always in accordance with the 
Moscow Declaration. Especially in many eastern regions, which were liberated 
after heavy fighting, the Soviet troops behaved like conquerors. Brutal incidents, as 
well as the authoritarian style of democratic reconstruction and the ‘automatic’ 
arrests of former Nazi functionaries, especially in the American zone, confirmed 
many Austrians in their views that the liberation by the Allied armies was a new 
form of occupation.40 Therefore, given the broad support and consensus Nazism 
had had in Austria, in popular historic memory as well as in many scholarly writ-
ings, the term ‘the period of occupation’ has become the common label for the 
years of 1945 through 1955, whereas the Nazi dictatorship is often called just the 
‘Anschluss period.’ 
In the course of the summer of 1945, the Allied powers divided the Austrian 
Länder as well as Vienna into four occupation zones. They formed a joint Allied 
military government and imposed upon the Austrian government a severe control 
system (First Control Agreement). Remarkably enough, the Viennese government 
succeeded in retaining the loyalty of the western and southern provinces and an-
nounced parliamentary elections at the end of the year. The election results were a 
surprise: the KPÖ won only 5 percent of the vote and the two other parties remained 
by far the strongest ones, as they had been before 1933, but in reverse order.41 
In the spring of 1945, the first political steps taken by the new Austria aimed at 
making a break with the Nazi era and re-establishing continuities with the First 
Republic on the level of politics and public law. The NSDAP and its associated 
organisations were outlawed on 8 May 1945 and every kind of pro-Nazi activity 
was forbidden. The former Nazis and activists of the SS and SA had to register in 
preparation for the process of denazification. They had to leave positions in offices 
and private businesses and lost the right to vote.42 
The Austrian constitution of 1920, in its reformed version of 1929, was adopted 
immediately. The remainder of the Austrian legal system was enforced step by step. 
But the Second Republic retained, for instance, the Nazi law regarding the ‘church-
tax,’ and the old-age pension scheme for workers introduced in Austria in 1939. 
The territory of Austria was exactly the same as before 1938. This decision 
caused severe disappointment among ardent Austrian patriots when they recognised 
after several years that Austria would not regain even the overwhelmingly German-
speaking parts of South Tyrol, which had been ceded to Italy after the First World 
War. On the other hand, Austria also did not have to cede the Slovene-speaking 
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border regions of Carinthia to Yugoslavia, which were claimed by Tito with Sta-
lin’s support until 1948. 
Along the same lines of continuity, the state symbols were either taken over 
from the First Republic (the red-white-red flag), or newly invented like the text of 
the national anthem. The state seal and the escutcheon were also readopted, though 
with some changes. Since 1945 they picture a single-headed eagle with the symbols 
of the bourgeoisie, a town wall crown, the workers, a hammer, and the farmers, a 
sickle, just as in the First Republic. But, in order to symbolise the liberation from 
Nazi rule, the eagle’s legs display a new element: the parts of a broken chain.43 
Leaving out of consideration the recently growing number of commemorative 
tablets, inscriptions or publicly marked sites, big monuments commemorating 
resistance and oppression during the Nazi regime, until the 1990s, were not frequent 
in Austria. But there is the important memorial site at the former concentration 
camp of Mauthausen, and smaller memorials at many branch camps, all of them 
commemorating the aspects of oppression and very few also the collaboration 
during the Nazi regime; this applies also to the heatedly discussed Holocaust mon-
ument of Rachel Whiteread which is under construction in Vienna. Two earlier 
monuments of Austria’s liberation or rebirth are really publicly visible: the stereo-
type liberating Soviet soldier on the column on Schwarzenberg, and the Monument 
against War and Fascism by Alfred Hrdlicka (1988), both in Vienna. In Austria, 
there is no single example of the German type of church ruin commemorating the 
bombings during the war. Most war damages have been repaired and, thus, making 
also the event publicly invisible. 
It seems as if in the first few months after the defeat of Nazism, everyday life 
and political and economic administration had surprisingly little difficulty in coping 
with such a massive break in the political system. It also relatively easily came to 
terms with the sometimes chaotic interference of rival political and occupation 
forces, which certainly increased the feeling of uncertainty under the double admin-
istration – Austrian versus Allied – which was slowly overcome after 1947. Never-
theless, in 1945 most Austrians, with the obvious exception of Jews, Gypsies and 
the small group of active political opponents, continued life in the same way as they 
had done earlier. They showed partial conformity, partial resistance and much 
indifference, and they wished they could have been spared the fear, the ever-
changing need for a guilty conscience, and what were undoubtedly the terrible 
hardships of 1945 and the next few years of crisis. 
This unveils the real problem of denazification and explains why it could only be 
partially successful.44 Certainly, as far as Austria was concerned, the problem was 
not so much the absence of a political willingness. Rather there existed two closely 
related and unsolvable dilemmas: the first was linked to the general problem of a 
return from dictatorship to democracy. It was an inherent contradiction to democra-
tise a country without pre-existing democratic institutions. As much as possible of 
the rules of legality and civil rights had to be retained as this change aimed to be a 
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democratic one. One has to admit that the founders of the Second Republic were in 
part aware of this dilemma, even if they do not seem to have very much cared for it. 
The second dilemma concerned the high Nazi party membership rates among cer-
tain professional groups in the public sector and in business. No drastic personnel 
changes were possible in 1945, as their expertise and skills were indispensable for 
establishing the new order and making possible the economic recovery. This was 
particularly true in those occupations controlling the legal and administrative sys-
tems, in education and in the specialised fields of production. Admittedly the extent 
to which denazification was carried out varied greatly from one profession and one 
region to the other. In general, however, it would appear that with the exception of 
the two changeover years of 1938 and 1945, when higher positions were subject to 
radical purges, the bureaucracies saw no drastic turnover of staff whatsoever. 
The processes of denazification in 1945 and 1947 revealed that about 14 percent 
of all adult Austrians had been Nazis. Especially high percentages of Nazi party 
members were found among academics, professions such as physicians and attor-
neys (38 percent), public employees (38 percent), private employees (29 percent) 
and farmers (26 percent).45 It seems that around 80 percent of schoolteachers and 70 
percent of university professors had been Nazis. 75 percent of the police had to be 
dismissed (many of them were replaced by communists in the Soviet zone) and half 
of all judges and attorneys general were purged because they had served under Nazi 
laws. Less severe was the situation in the sector of private businesses.46 In 1945, a 
total of 270,000 Nazis had been employed in Austria. About half of them were 
dismissed by mid-1946, but in the course of the amnesty many of them were soon 
re-employed, in their former or in similar positions. 
Over the years a total of 55,000 Nazis were arrested and many of them interned 
in Glasenbach (near Salzburg) and other internment camps. When they were re-
leased, most of them returned, by no means ‘re-educated’ but integrated into an 
unofficial network of the Glasenbacher. Newly established ‘people’s courts’ con-
victed 13,600 former Nazis. Forty-three individuals were given death penalties, of 
which thirty were carried out. Already in 1946 and 1947, small groups of Nazis 
tried to re-establish a new Nazi organisation, but were soon brought under control 
by the anti-Nazi legislation. 
In the parliamentary elections of 1949, the former Nazis were free to vote again. 
During the subsequent years most of them were granted full amnesty and were 
reintegrated into Austrian society. This was partly a side effect of the Cold War 
which exchanged the Nazi question for anti-communism in the West. As frequent 
estimations believe, one third of the ex-Nazis were absorbed into the ÖVP, one 
third joined as sympathisers of the SPÖ, and one third formed the core of the 
League of Independents (Verband der Unabhängigen – VdU) which was indeed a 
collection of ex-Nazis. However, this organisation also attracted a certain number 
of Liberals and protest votes from the non-political elements. Even though the VdU 
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and its 12 percent share of votes disintegrated in 1956, its appearance indicated that 
the traditional ‘Third Power’47 in Austria’s political system, pan-Germanism, had 
survived. It continued in a reduced and changed manner under the title of the Free-
dom Party of Austria (FPÖ). 
5.  The ‘Long Durée’ of the Nazi Heritage 
After 1947, Austria gradually re-emerged as a subject of international law. Through 
the flexibility in negotiations by political leaders between the two opponents in the 
Cold War, and with the consensus about foreign policy existing between the ÖVP 
and the SPÖ, Austria could overcome the most critical period until the death of 
Stalin in 1953. Even if the negotiations for a peace treaty with the four Great Pow-
ers – the Austrian diplomats spoke consistently of a state treaty – were nearly fro-
zen during these years, Austria could gradually weaken the remaining restraints on 
her sovereignty. Austria could even join the Marshall Plan and the Western eco-
nomic order, without strong objections from the Soviet Union. Thus Austria could 
profit from massive economic support. She received the highest amount of funding 
per capita among all the nations being included into the European Recovery Pro-
gramme and therefore experienced remarkable economic growth. In a period of 
diplomatic thaw, while secret preparations to include Austria in the new NATO 
pact were underway, the Soviet Union gave up its blockade against negotiations 
concerning Austria’s future. Finally, on 15 May 1955 the State Treaty48 could be 
signed. It guaranteed Austria’s independence and integrity, stated a prohibition of a 
future Anschluss with Germany and obliged Austria to thwart all forms of Nazi 
activities. The unofficial price paid for full sovereignty was assurance of permanent 
military neutrality.49 This was declared as ‘voluntary’ by Austria following the 
withdrawal of the four occupational armies. 
During the following decades, and during the changing phases of Austria’s for-
eign policy until the early 1990s, neutrality remained almost unquestioned among 
the political elites. It even became an important element of the self-image of the 
Austrians, as has been proven by several opinion polls. In the early 1990s, 80 per-
cent of a representative sample agreed to the statement ‘Neutrality is an essential 
part of the idea of the Austrian state’ (whereas only 12 percent disagreed). Already 
in the late 1970s, in contrast to earlier self-images and ‘historic missions,’ Austrians 
preferred to live in a small state (78 percent versus 18 per cent who preferred to be 
part of a great power). A large majority defined Austria’s international role as a 
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‘bridge between East and West’ (75 percent yes) and as a ‘neutral zone of peace 
between the blocks of power’ (75 percent yes).50 Only in the 1990s did this image 
start to change deeply again. 
This clearly indicates that neutrality has been made an integral part of Austrian 
national identity during the Second Republic. Even if present-day Austrians feel 
strongly sympathetic and kindred to the Germans, they have turned away from 
ideas of interwar Anschluss and pan-Germanism.51 These signs are indicated by 
opinion research data. They show an increase of Austrian patriotism, only 49 per-
cent in 1956 to more than 90 percent in the 1990s. Correspondingly the percentage 
of those feeling themselves as belonging to the German ‘cultural’ nation declined. 
Displaying a kind of atavistic national pride, Austria’s citizens have developed 
since the 1970s a marked national identity as Austrians. This is certainly a direct 
result of the learning process the Austrians underwent during the course of post-
1945 history.52 
This – compared to most other European nations – late nation-building process 
has certainly been supported by Austria’s economic success and by social policies 
since the beginning of the 1950s. Especially until the 1980s Austria’s economy 
went through a long period of reconstruction and growth. In this respect Austria 
does not differ very much from Western Germany,53 a country to which it is linked 
to by close monetary, economic and cultural ties, especially since the 1960s. 
Nazism had fundamentally altered the basis of Austria’s political culture. Thus, 
the Second Republic has enjoyed a remarkable freedom from political violence and 
strikes. There is no doubt that, until 1999, the political system of post-1945 Austria 
had to a very high degree been characterised by stability. The balance of power in 
parliament has not seriously fluctuated, and the share of seats enjoyed by the two 
strongest parliamentary parties until the late 1980s was always very high. The 
recruitment of Nationalrat members has been a relatively continuous process. Only 
the period around 1966 showed a clear generational gap within the Parliament.54 
Finally, the Republic’s constitution – taken, as is well known, from the First Repub-
lic – has not often been questioned and has not been subjected to any fundamental 
alterations. Even if the composition of the governments varied sometimes, the idea 
of party cooperation in different kinds of grand coalition governments was domi-
nant in practical politics for decades. Thus there existed a long-lasting division of 
political and economic power among the major political forces linked with propor-
tional distribution of posts in the bureaucracies and in the state-owned corporations, 
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since the 1950s underpinned by the system of social partnership outside the sphere 
of politics. But in the late 1990s, after the end of global bipolarity and under the 
impact of the integration of the country into the European Union and ‘globalisa-
tion,’ this system showed signs of the coming change of 2000: the formation of the 
‘black-blue’ coalition government which marks, as late as it is, the end of the post-
war period in Austria. 
This institutional framework for conflict resolution on the economic and social 
political level was a highly developed model of cooperative, non-confrontational 
decision making, dealing with most major issues in economic and social policy. 
Usually, decisions were negotiated through settlements by representatives of the 
opposing economic interests, mainly the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber 
of Agriculture on the one hand, and the Chamber of Labour and the ÖGB on the 
other. The degree of unification and centralisation enjoyed by these interest organi-
sations in the Second Republic was to a large extent also an outcome of the periods 
of authoritarianism. Each partner in the main body of the social partnership, the 
Parity Commission, had (and to some extent still has) equal weight in the decision-
making process. These decisions were mediated from case to case by the govern-
ment and took place outside public control. They were based upon the consensus 
that the opposing partners in this ‘class struggle’ through negotiation voluntarily 
observed certain formal procedures and stuck to certain principles of economic 
distribution without any written system of rules and regulations.55 The Austrian 
social partnership system has been quite rightly considered the central sociopolitical 
institution in the Second Republic.56 
This long-lasting stability of social partnership may be explained also by the po-
litical psychology at work. An ‘enlightened,’ consensus-oriented political elite has 
found full allegiance among the (socially and educationally) lower and middle 
classes. It is also benefiting directly from the depoliticising experiences of these 
groups and their attitudes towards authority as it was before 1945, attitudes which 
have survived as the ‘para-Nazi substratum’57 of Austrian society and politics. The 
high degree of electoral and trade union involvement, shown by the Austrians until 
the late 1980s, was not necessarily the product of strong democratic maturity but 
rather of scepticism towards democratic institutions and fear of the authorities; thus, 
many Austrians kept following the orders or wishes of their superiors. Only the 
appearance of a Green party in the 1980s and the short-lived Liberals which split 
off from the FPÖ in the early 1990s, together with the rise of populism in the form 
of Haider’s FPÖ,58 indicated the weakening of this Austrian consensual system. 
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Discontinuity with Nazism on the level of the political system and within the po-
litical elites corresponded to strong continuity of basic political attitudes on the part 
of the masses, which had their roots in the periods 1934-38 and 1938-45. 
It was not only in the years of 1946 to 1948 that the inhabitants of the British 
and US zones in Vienna agreed by 51 to 27 percent when asked if they believed 
‘that Nazism was [...] a good idea, which was only badly executed.’ Also, for in-
stance, in 1976, another representative opinion study revealed that 21 percent of the 
Austrians were prepared to agree to the statement: ‘that one politician alone should 
be in charge,’ and an even higher number thought ‘that some nations are inferior 
and others are superior’ (23 percent and 16 percent respectively). Many also sug-
gested repression of ‘dangerous political opponents’ through imprisonment (20 
percent), banishing them (16 percent), or bringing them to their senses by putting 
them under pressure (9 percent).59 Again, in 1992, the ‘authoritarian potential’ in 
Austria was calculated at 48 percent of the population, and the potential of German 
national sentiments still amounted to 34 percent. Some 32 percent were ‘anxious 
about strangers’ and 20 percent ‘felt alienated.’ 
Equally disquieting were the findings of public opinion research about anti-
Semitism, even if these results are often questionable and sometimes interpreted in 
an impressionistic way. On the whole they are related to political incidents 
throughout the decades since 1945.60 Anti-Semitic prejudices have been kept alive, 
even if there might be slight tendencies of a growing awareness of the ‘impossibil-
ity’ of anti-Semitism after the Holocaust and/or of replacing the earlier main target 
of xenophobia – the ‘Jew’ – by others, such as the ‘Gypsies’ or the ‘Turks.’ Thus, 
in the 1970s and 1980s 8 to 10 percent of the population might have been ‘hardcore 
anti-Semites’ who admitted that they felt physical disgust shaking hands with 
Jews.61 Consequently, flagrant anti-Jewish statements among Austrian politicians, 
verbal and sometimes physical attacks against Jews, and acts of vandalism against 
Jewish symbols and gravestones have occurred from time to time, even if these 
incidents were less violent and frequent compared with present-day Germany. They 
have alternated with anti- Jewish allusions in the mass media and in political propa-
ganda. Scandalous indeed were the anti-Semitic statements in the closed-door meet-
ings of the first Austrian governments.62 On the surface, there was an ‘anti-
Semitism without anti-Semites’63 but whenever wilful control of emotions was 
overwhelmed, plain anti-Semitism came to the surface. The ‘front stage’ of the 
inner Austrian self turned easily outward and revealed the anti-Semitic ‘back 
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stage.’64 This was particularly the case during the Waldheim affair in the second 
half of the 1980s. 
Thus, the eagerness for restitution of ‘Aryanised’ Jewish properties and posses-
sions by the Austrian government has remained very reluctant and restricted until 
1998 when external moral pressure, especially from the USA was put on Austria. In 
contrast to the Federal Republic of Germany,65 Austria has refused to pay summary 
compensations to Israel as she presented herself as ‘Nazism’s first victim,’66 and 
Austria even resisted and delayed for a long time individual compensations for 
Austrian Jews.67 The main line of argument, that Jews and Austrians had been in 
the same situation, both are victims of Nazism,68 culminated during and after the 
1986 election campaign for Kurt Waldheim’s presidency.69 But his notorious utter-
ance ‘During the war I did nothing different than hundreds of thousands of other 
Austrians; namely, doing my duty as a soldier’ indicated the strong undercurrents in 
many Austrians’ collective memory contradicting the democratic surface and the 
‘victim’ thesis. Jörg Haider’s notorious sayings are referring to and reinforcing this 
mental substratum. This is true even if, as an unintended positive result, the Wald-
heim controversy and the activities of public commemoration fifty years after 1938 
had caused a partial redefinition of Austria’s self-image; thus, the Austrian Chan-
cellor Franz Vranitzky for the first time could admit in the Austrian Parliament in 
1991 that ‘many Austrians had greeted the Anschluss [...] and participated in repres-
sive measures and acts of persecution of the Third Reich, in part in leading posi-
tions.70 
Anti-Semitic and xenophobic prejudices have been more or less widespread 
among Austrians of all age groups, classes and regions. They were stronger among 
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Catholic conservatives than among Social Democrats, who displayed strong 
tendencies of protectionism against a foreign labour force and whose rank and file 
as well as leaders also displayed anti-Semitic prejudices. But they are markedly 
strongest among the followers of the FPÖ. Especially since Haider took over the 
party leadership in 1986, the FPÖ has shifted from traditional German nationalism 
and liberal positions towards the extreme political right. Haider’s populism, his 
verbal aggressiveness and provocations,71 and his often more than ambiguous 
statements about Nazism, the ‘foreigners’ and the Austrian nation have been hon-
oured by his steadily growing electorate until 1999. They seem to express the re-
maining (or growing) resentments against the post-1945 elites, the official political 
values and the existing democratic system, and it was exactly this that had caused 
concern among many Western politicians as the Haider FPÖ has been attacking the 
anti-Nazi consensus of the European Union. 
Even more disturbing than this phenomenon itself is the fact that inside Austria 
such a mentality met only a temporally and politically limited resistance. The ‘writ-
ing on the wall’ could be the formation of an ÖVP-FPÖ-coalition government and 
the fact that the political heirs of the old Catholic conservatism abandoned their 
earlier anti-Nazi traditions. But the growth of the FPÖ had also strongly profited 
from the decline of the former party loyalties, the preceding petrification of the 
traditional parties, the interest organisations and the party system as a whole.72 It also 
profited from the ideas of the ‘limits of the social welfare state’ and the worldwide 
turn towards economic and social individualism. But it mainly benefits from the 
spread of xenophobia linked with the opening of the borders to Eastern Europe after 
the disintegration of the communist regimes, from the open support of the most 
influential tabloid newspaper (Neue Kronen-Zeitung), and from indulging feelings 
of social insecurity. In the mid-1990s, Haider openly aimed at introducing a severe 
change in the Austrian political system: a ‘Third Republic.’73 The rise of the FPÖ 
made Haider the most successful right-populist leader and became an ominous 
example in Europe.74 Haider’s rhetoric and electoral success might be considered, 
at least in part, as a late revelation of Austria’s deficient dealings with its Nazi past 
and the loss of the legitimising belief in Austria’s long-lasting ‘lie of living’ – the 
‘victim’ myth – and as the ‘revenge’ of Austria’s lasting authoritarian or para-Nazi 
heritage. This might reveal that many problems had been left unresolved under the 
surface of the ‘success story’ of fifty years of the Second Republic. 
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6.  Summary 
Like many other European states which had passed through periods of dictatorial 
rule in the twentieth century, Austrians experienced two kinds of dictatorship, the 
authoritarian Ständestaat (‘Austro-Fascism’) and the post-Anschluss Nazi regime. 
The later – being much more severe – had caused the deeper breaks and in part 
stronger effects in Austrian history under long-term perspectives; the earlier dicta-
torship was overridden by Nazism, but its legacies for post-1945 Austria were also 
vigorous, though less recognisable. 
In the economy, Nazi anti-Jewish policy was fuelled by and brought profit to 
many Austrians. The persecution and extermination of Austrian Jewry amounted to 
the most deep-reaching ‘revolutionary’ change probably since the Counter-
reformation period, it demodernised Austria (especially Vienna) culturally and 
mentally for decades, and together with the Third Reich’s war policy left immense 
permanent losses of life. The Greater-German war economy set a shift of the inter-
nal weights to the Austrian west in motion, resulted in a kind of modernisation of 
the Austrian economy and eased (postwar) social mobility. It led to a ‘deprovincial-
isation’ of the Austrian Länder and levelled earlier centre-periphery contrasts, and 
unintentionally contributed to the low conflict level and the extraordinary strong 
neocorporatist (social partnership) system of half a century of postwar Austria. In 
the latter respect, the mental roots and societal consequences of ‘Austro-Fascism’ 
also played an important and lasting role. 
Whereas the Ständestaat can be attributed to the line of Austrian Catholic con-
servatism, Nazism belongs to the (until 1945) strong pan-German national tradi-
tions of the country, even if the Nazi regime cannot be simply and exclusively 
understood as either a German (external) or Austrian (internal) phenomenon: Na-
zism inside Austria was both. Under the label of Austrian national identity to which 
the Ständestaat had given an important impulse authoritarianism and its corporatist, 
antidemocratic traditions and remains were often whitewashed. In contrast to this, 
pan-Germanism, having been an important factor for the growth of Nazism among 
Austrians, was delegitimised by the (lost) war as well as by the harsh dictatorial and 
anti-Austrian effects of the Third Reich. The (re)construction of democracy in 
Austria was to a great extent following the logic of externalisation of Nazism and 
minimising its autochthonous aspects, as can be demonstrated with reference to the 
(half-hearted and inconsequent) denazification, the lack of compensation for the 
persecution of Jews and other ‘racial’ or ethnic victims, and an unique (among 
Western political cultures) deficit of public sensibility for anti-Semitic and Nazi 
traits in Austrian society (e.g. ways of speaking and political argumentation, beliefs, 
political symbols). The political myth of Second Republic Austria as a mere ‘vic-
tim’ of Nazism (i.e. Hitler and Germany) became a crucial reference point in the 
(successful) process of nation building in the second half of the twentieth century 
and in the (less thoroughgoing) process of democratisation of Austrian society, 
resulting in the Austrian social partnership which was undoubtedly successful until 
the 1970s, but then turned out to become a factor of a certain political and societal 
petrification of the country. 
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Thus, the long-term consequences of the dictatorial phases in the 1930s and 
1940s were intertwined, reinforcing or counter-balancing each other, and often had 
ambiguous effects and side-effects. Very generally speaking, post-1945 Austria 
resulted from a restoration of democracy, continuities in society and mentality, and 
learning processes in politics. The phenomenon of a ‘second dictatorship’ made the 
Austrian ease complex and served often and for a long time as an excuse in thor-
oughly overcoming the Nazi past. 
 
